UMRC’s
preliminary
findings
from Afghanistan & Operation Enduring Freedom
1.
Unanticipated results
of the Afghan civilian studies
2.
Afghan civilians contaminated with Non-depleted Uranium
–
not, Depleted Uranium
3. Civilian studies
corroborated by OEF bomb-crater samples
4. How were the study
subjects selected?
5. Why UMRC looked for
Non-depleted Uranium (as opposed to DU)
6. Why UMRC conducted
radiological studies on Afghans
7. Contrasting the Afghan
finding with Gulf War Veterans results
8. Leading, anti-DU
activist challenges UMRC’s Afghan findings
9. Access to UMRC’s
Afghan data
10. Examining the
origin of Afghan civilians’ contamination
1.
Unanticipated outcomes of the 2002 Afghan civilian studies
Radiological measurements
of the uranium concentrations in Afghan civilians’ urine samples
indicate abnormally high levels of non-depleted uranium. Radiological
measurements of Afghan civilians’ have high concentrations of uranium in
a range beginning at 4 X’s and reaching to over 20 X’s normal
populations. This is 400% to 2000% higher than the study controls and
normal population baselines of the concentrations of nanograms of
uranium per liter of urine in a 24-hour sample. UMRC has completed
initial but still preliminary studies that corroborate these finding in
biological controls and geological samples taken in Operation Enduring
Freedom bombsites.
These findings are
significant in three ways:
1. The
volumes (total concentrations) of uranium in the civilians studied are
abnormally high as compared to local population controls. The only
other findings presenting with these high concentrations are
historically anomalous in certain populations exposed via unusual
geological and technological (including occupational) conditions.
2. 100%
of the studied population in the preliminary sample groups in
Afghanistan is positive for these abnormally high concentrations.
3. The
isotopic signature of the uranium in the Afghan study population is
Non-depleted Uranium. This is an unexpected finding in that there has
been no report of or confirmed findings of Non-Depleted Uranium in OEF
or other military conflicts. It is not know at this point if the uranium
is adulterated with transuranics.
2.
Afghan civilians exposed to OEF bombing contaminated with Non-depleted
Uranium – not, Depleted Uranium.
The isotopic ratios of the
uranium contaminant measured in Afghan civilians show that it is not
Depleted Uranium (DU). The isotopes of uranium found in the Afghan
civilians’ urine is Non-Depleted Uranium. The only explanations of this
finding are either anomalous geological and agricultural conditions
(fertilizers) or the presence of uranium extracted from the front-end of
the fuel or weapons production cycles. Whereas DU is a by-product of the
uranium enrichment process, non-depleted uranium (NDU) is the feed stock
of the enrichment phase of the fuel and weapons development cycles.
3.
Civilian studies are corroborated by bomb-crater samples and control
samples of local geological samples
UMRC investigated the
possible origins of this contamination. The preliminary results of the
radiological urine analysis are corroborated by radiological
measurements of debris and weapons’ fragment samples at OEF (Operation
Enduring Freedom) target sites and bomb-craters. A discussion of the
postulated origins of contamination and subsequent field investigations
to follow-up these findings are provided in UMRC’s Field Report:
“Precise Destruction -- Indiscriminate Effects”, posted on
this web-site and the discussion posted below: “Examining the origin of
Afghan civilians’ contamination”.
4. How were the subjects
selected ?
The Afghan urine samples
were collected from a group selected randomly within a triaged or first
level screening of a broader population. The triaging identified
persons who report (or based on physicians’ reports) medical symptoms
and public health conditions indicating uranium internal contamination.
The first level of triage had to satisfy two criteria: (1) the people
present with the classic symptoms of acute and/or chronic internal
exposure to uranium by inhalation; and, (2) they had a reliable history
that placed them within a defined radius of exposure at the time of the
OEF bombing (and/or living and working within this radius following the
cessation of the bombing).
UMRC’s Field Team found
several hundred civilians with acute symptoms and reportedly developing,
chronic symptoms of uranium internal contamination (including congenital
problems in newborns). All subjects’ on-set of symptoms are reported
to coincide with the calendar dates of the bombing and were not present
prior to the bombing. A randomly selected urine specimen donors’
sub-group was sub-selected out of the adult male population of the
first-level triaged population. Males-only were selected to respect the
cultural preferences of communities participating in the study. The
sample and specimen collection method is outlined in UMRC’s study, which
has been accepted for publishing and will be made available on this
website following peer review.
5. Why
UMRC looked for Non-depleted Uranium (as opposed to DU)
Radiological
measurements of any populations’ urine specimens identify, as a standard
practice, the abundance of each of the 3 naturally occurring isotopes of
uranium (U234, 235, 238). These isotopes’ abundances (quantities) are
measured as a fraction of the uranium released in a 24-hour sample of
urine. The ratios of the two most abundant isotopes (235, 238) are also
measured. This ratio presents a specific signature that expresses the
type of uranium in the sample. The isotopic ratios (proportions) of the
uranium in the urine collected in Afghanistan has the unmistakable
signature of Non-Depleted Uranium. It does not express the isotopic
ratio of DU. This does not rule out the possibility that future studies
of Afghans may detect Depleted Uranium. This depends on the weapons that
may be linked to any possible contamination identified in other exposed
groups.
6.
Why UMRC conducted radiological studies on Afghans
UMRC’s initial research on Afghan civilians was undertaken
in response to five leading indicators:
Within weeks of the cessation of Operation Enduring
Freedom’s bombing campaign, public health officials, civilians, the
Afghan government, international NGO’s (including UN agencies) began to
report public health problems matching the profile of uranium internal
contamination. These anecdotal reports were similar to veterans and
civilian health problems reported from the Gulf War (Desert Storm and
Desert Fox) and Operation Allied Force (Serbia, Herzegovina and Kosovo).
Operation Enduring Freedom was reported to be using some of
the same weapons’ delivery systems and ordnance used in Operation Desert
Storm, Operation Desert Fox, and Operation Allied Force. Operation
Desert Fox, which took place in Iraq in the mid-1990’s, was known to be
using advance weaponry and testing new generations of precision guided
missiles (not used in Desert Storm). Official and unofficial medical
and public health reports from Iraq indicated a growing number of
deleterious health effects associated with the 1991 Desert Storm bombing
and the continued bombing of Iraq’s northern and southern, non-fly
zones. Reports also stem from certain Middle Eastern countries adjacent
to the Persian Gulf conflict areas.
Independent research and publicly available documentation of
NATO and US weapons’ development programs hinted at or noted directly
that non-fissionable (non-thermal nuclear) uranium weapons (including DU)
development programs are still underway. Sources include: military
research laboratories and sub-contract research & development programs;
the US Science Based Stockpile Stewardship Program; the Federation of
American Scientists; veterans’ reports; and, the annual reports and
advertising of independent weapons contractors. US military health
warnings to OEF personnel indicate the presence of radiological
contaminants; recommending troops take protection measures. OEF’s
forward targeting personnel, Special Forces and post-bombing, site
inspection teams have been given radiation protection instructions,
radiation detectors and protective equipment prior to and since entering
Afghanistan.
The U.S. DBHT (Deeply Buried Hard Target) Project, aimed at
developing weapons to destroy biological, nuclear and chemical weapons
storage and manufacturing facilities in rogue states; and, the US
Strategic Military Plan and US Nuclear Posture Review expresses
intentions to use new classes of weapons in Afghanistan and other
states. This program was known to be accelerating its weapons
development and experiments in readiness for a possible Iraqi
incursion. The White House and US-DOD spoke frequently about the
development and use of fission, low-yield and non-fission, seismic
bunker- and cave-busters. These weapons, by design, require heavy
ballast and narrow diameter casings that can drive deeply into the earth
or through super-reinforced military targets, tough enough to withstand
high velocity impacts before they reach detonation depth.
These new generations of weapons and the targets for which
they are designed dictate specific features and functions: They are
designed as “self-forging” and capable of punching through
multi-layered, extra-reinforced, hardened-targets. They must be able to
defeat 14 to 20 feet of heavily reinforced concrete. Unlike the Gulf
War DU armour defeat penetrators, these new warheads would be used in
conjunction with high explosive charges and or high-pressure, shaped
charges and delayed-action detonators (set to predetermined stand-off
distances in some cases and to penetration depths controlled by altitude
and void sensitivity sensors in others – depending on the ordnance and
target).
By the DOD’s own admission, the best performing metal that
consistently fits these functional military profiles is uranium and
alloys of uranium. Titanium and tungsten are not suitable as the prime
alloy base for these purposes. Uranium (whether NDU or DU) offers
unique structural features and the chemistry best suited for the defeat
of deep, bunkerized targets, multiple types of targets in area denial
munitions, and penetrating composite ceramic and metal armoured targets.
Uranium can be engineered to be “self-sharpening” so that
when it hits a target, it retains its punching point as material erodes
off the warhead (titanium and tungsten will not do this). Uranium’s
molecular structure can re-formed, using metallurgical and
“nano-technologies” to deliver a selected range of ballistic features,
including kinetic, thermal, pyrophoric, liquid metal and
high-pressure/high-heat, plasma effects. Uranium is a readily available
metal, cheap to produce and is in abundance in DOE’s, DOD’s and their
weapon’s contractors’ stockpiles. Uranium has been designated a high
priority material for scientific research on new weapons and “stockpile
re-cycling” as a strategic and capital asset into multiple military
applications.
In the early stages of OEF, the Afghan government reported
publicly, radiological illnesses amongst the civilian population. The
White House reported finding uranium-alloyed warheads in local
arsenals. UK intelligence and the Pentagon reported that there is
evidence from captured Taliban strongholds that uranium dispersion and
dirty-bombs were being developed in Afghanistan.
7.
Contrasting Afghan results with Gulf War Veterans’ results
UMRC’s preliminary
radiological measurements and analysis of Afghan civilians who live
and/or work adjacent to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) bombsites are
notably different from the Gulf War veterans’ findings:
Radiological assessments
of Afghan civilians show the presence of a distinctly different form or
type of uranium. The Afghan civilians’ urine, studied to date, does not
contain Depleted Uranium. It contains abnormally high levels of
Non-depleted Uranium. Gulf war veterans, on the other hand, present,
conclusively, with Depleted Uranium. See: The Quantitative Analysis
of Depleted Uranium Isotopes in British, Canadian, and
U.S. Gulf war Veterans, Military
Medicine, August 2002.
UMRC’s continued research in Afghanistan may or may not identify DU.
This will depend upon the munitions deployed, the bombsites inspected
and results of further urine studies of populations that may have been
exposed to DU.
The abundance (quantities)
of the uranium in 100% of the Afghan urine samples showing abnormally
high total concentrations and the isotopes specific to Non-Depleted
Uranium have been identified 4 to 8 months after the cessation of the
bombing. 50% of the Gulf veterans tested by UMRC were positive for
detectable levels of DU. The quantities of DU in the Gulf veterans’
urine were measured 7 – 9 years after exposure. Normal biological and
metabolic processes and the life cycle of uranium incorporated via
inhalation result in a progressive reduction, over time, of the amounts
that can be found in urine.
The veterans in UMRC’s studies
were also triaged based on their symptom profiles and histories of
exposure. The fact that radiological studies on veterans yielded
approximately 50% positive results for DU can be explained by the
relative elapsed time from the date of exposure to the date of analysis
and the estimated total concentrations of uranium and DU taken into the
body at the time of exposure.
It is possible that the
Gulf veterans who did not test positive were originally contaminated but
the quantities of DU in their urine may be below instrument detection
limits this late after exposure.
The Afghan civilian studies
began within a few months following the reported dates of exposure to
OEF bombing. The amount of uranium per weapon and possibly the ballistic
behaviors of the weapons used in Afghanistan may result in greater
relative volumes of aerosolized particulate available for inhalation.
The chemistry of the Afghan uranium, the biospheric transport mechanisms
and the metabolic characteristics may also be different. The Afghan
population studied is relatively stable and concentrated, unlike the
transient patterns of military personnel in the Gulf. There are
differences in the length of time of exposure and potential for chronic
and repeated exposure of Afghans (via re-suspension of uranium
particulate) whose environmental risk is on-going. The associated
environmental contamination will be long-term, leading to chronic
exposure to the civilian population and foreign workers.
UMRC’s Afghan
civilian findings have been criticised by a leading anti-DU activist.
Responding to this criticism may shed light on questions of those who
are understandably confused by the discovery of Non-depleted Uranium and
its possible use by Operation Enduring Freedom. Below is the reply
(objections are indented and in quote marks):
“UMRC’s findings of
Non-depleted Uranium (as opposed to Depleted Uranium) confuses the
public’s understanding of the issues”:
Depleted
Uranium and Non-depleted Uranium are both species of uranium. UMRC is
reporting the isotopic signatures of the uranium found in the Afghan
civilians’ urine. Since Depleted Uranium was not found, it was not
reported. This does not rule out the possibility that future studies
may identify DU in Afghanistan. For a discussion of the possible
origins of this contamination, see below: “Origin of the Afghan
civilians’ uranium, internal contamination”.
“UMRC’s field research
investigations concluding that the US and NATO have deployed a new
generation of weapons incorporating Non-depleted Uranium is not
substantiated by public domain information about the ordnance deployed
by Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan”:
UMRC’s Field
Trip Report’s conclusions as to the origin of the Afghan civilians’
uranium internal contamination is preliminary, based on (1) a follow-up
field investigation to identify the origins and (2) radiological
analysis of bomb-crater debris taken from the sites adjacent to the
contaminated population and survivors from the blasts. The reader is
invited to review UMRC’s Afghan Field Report excerpts: “Precise
Destruction-Indiscriminate Effects” found on this web-site.
“The abnormally high
levels of uranium found in Afghan civilians are exaggerated and
needlessly alarm troops, veterans and civilians in Operations Enduring
Freedom”:
UMRC is not
pleased to have identified such high concentrations of uranium in the
biological specimens Afghan civilians. These levels of uranium internal
contamination are considered medically significant. They point to a
potential public health disaster for Afghanistan if corroborated by
on-going studies of a wider population and OEF bombsites. The results
reported are not discretionary and have been reported according to the
laboratory readings.
The
abnormally high levels of internalised uranium in Afghans were measured
at a point in time much closer to the date of bombing. This may point
to higher than previously calculated risks to Operations’ Desert Storm
veterans who might have presented with significantly higher
concentrations of uranium if studies of their urine had been conducted
at a responsible point in time more closely following exposure. These
results are also indicative that, if uranium is in use, the new
generation of OEF weapons produce significantly higher levels of
contaminant than DU penetrators.
9.
Access to UMRC’s detailed Afghan data
UMRC does not release,
publicly, its detailed findings until they are peer-reviewed and
published. The peer review and scientific publishing process is lengthy
but necessary to ensure efficacy and accuracy. UMRC’s results on
Afghanistan civilians are presented on this web site as “preliminary”
(pending peer review). Until our research is published UMRC’s policy is
to withhold all but general and summary information about
research-in-process. Detailed information about UMRC’s Gulf War
Veterans’ studies are published and can be found on our web site and in
the published, peer-reviewed journals and proceedings of scientific
conferences.
Irrespective of the source
of the uranium contaminant resulting in the Afghan results, abnormally
high concentrations of uranium are medically significant. The
Non-depleted Uranium in the subjects’ urine has warranted further
investigation to expand the scope of the research, corroborate the
biological and geological results and broaden the study populations.
UMRC’s continues to investigate all possible origins of this uranium
contamination.
UMRC’s follow-up and
on-going research results will be reported in future, peer reviewed
studies. A discussion of the possible origins or this contamination
can be found in the Field Trip #2 Report: “Precise
Destruction – Indiscriminate Effects”. To date, there is no
evidence of geological or other conditions that might explain the
contamination. Significantly, the on-set of acute, uranium internal
contamination symptoms coincide with the dates of Operations Enduring
Freedom’s bombing campaign and match bomb-crater and target site
samples.
Other possible origins
investigated include geological sources, agricultural sources
(fertilizers), local military uses, and possibly other foreign
technological and military sources. To date, all postulated
alternatives pertain to a variety of other types of uranium (signified
by different arrays of isotopic ratios): Naturally occurring Uranium (NU),
Depleted Uranium (DU), Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), Highly Enriched
Uranium (HEU), dirty uranium (spent fuel products, reactor and weapons’
development or manufacturing waste and re-mixed military grade and
reactor oxides); local uranium mining, milling and processing;
agricultural use or other commercial phosphates; Soviet fission weapons
disassembly; and, natural uranium ore products released and aerosolized
by the kinetic and high explosive impacts of conventional, deep-penetrator
ordnance.
With the exception of
Natural Uranium, alternative explanations are attributable to
radio-isotopic signatures (ratios of isotopes of uranium) not
substantiated by the laboratory results of Afghan civilians and
bombsites. The isotopic measurements are objectively reliable and
cannot be misrepresented other than by intentional adulteration of the
specimens or intentional efforts to contaminate the population to mask
the origins of contamination. Notably, the results of the analysis of
biological specimens (urine) and the bomb-crater samples are
compatible.
The possibility of Natural
Uranium remains under investigation. Local geological samples and
controls do not substantiate a source other than the OEF bombing. There
are no geological, commercial and agricultural phenomena or activities
and uses in the environs of the contaminated populations that might
explain the contamination. UMRC invites reasonable explanations and
continues to investigate alternatives or evidence that might explain
origins other than uranium-alloyed and composite uranium-high-explosive
ordnance deployed by Operation Enduring Freedom.
For Further Information Contact UMRC: info@umrc.net |
