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12 years too late
?
How Canadian and U.S. Defense Departments
reveal veterans’ post-conflict follow-up programs
are not capable of detecting Depleted Uranium
The
research and writing of this paper is dedicated to the memory of
Captain J. Terry Riordon
Terry is the first Canadian, Persian Gulf War veteran whose cause of death
was officially determined to be Gulf War Illness . He died with his
bones and
organs full of Depleted Uranium. Terry's widow, Susan, is a loyal Canadian
and hard working
advocate seeking justice on behalf of sick and dying Gulf
and Balkan veterans
contaminated by DU.
T.W.
C
o
n
t
e
n
t
s
Introduction
-
Intentional delays, questionable science, or both ?
-
Contradictions between government and independent researc
The Canadian DU Screening Program
-
Canada’s
“voluntary DU screening program”
-
What
veterans should know: Mechanisms of uranium internal contamination
-
DND
explains why is can’t find DU
-
Playing
Russian roulette with veterans’ lives
-
DND
ignores recommendations for how to detect DU
-
Is DND
trying to mislead veterans and their families ?
The U.S. DU Follow-Up Program
Conclusion
-
Recycled
uranium – complicating the mix
Footnotes
March 2003
Tedd Weyman, Deputy Director
Uranium Medical Research Centre
www.UMRC.net
TWeyman@UMRC.net
* *
*
12 years too late
?
How Canadian and U.S. Defense Departments
reveal veterans’ post-conflict follow-up programs
are not capable of detecting Depleted Uranium
Introduction
Intentional delays, questionable science, or both
?
For 12
years, Gulf War veterans, and later, veterans of the Balkans, have been asking
their governments to conduct radiological assessments to determine if they
have been contaminated by the battlefield uses of Depleted Uranium (DU).
Uranium bio-assaying of urine samples can conclusively rule in or out, the
presence of artificial uranium in veterans suffering from a host of illnesses
coinciding with deployment in conflicts where NATO and Allied Forces use DU
kinetic penetrators and other, less well known radiological weapons. Veterans
cannot get this type of test through their doctors or hospitals because
radiological testing equipment is not used in clinical laboratories.
After nearly
a decade of debate about the origins of “Gulf War Syndrome,” accompanied by
unexplained, premature deaths and systemic, debilitating illnesses, including
inherited effects in veterans’ offspring, Canada and the U.S. are facing
pressure to fix their DU follow-up and screening programs. Prompting the
governments is evidence published by non-governmental researchers showing
deceased and ill Gulf War veterans are in fact, contaminated by DU.
Two
government reports, one from Canada,
and one from the U.S.
are an acknowledgement how these two governments’ failure to conduct reliable
DU studies is a calamity for veterans. Both Defense Departments admit
significant limitations in their laboratories’ abilities to carryout
radiological and bio-assay screening programs and glaring weaknesses in
clinical, DU follow-up programs. These papers and the U.S. DOD’s
Environmental Exposure Reports on DU in the Gulf
and the Balkans
reveal, by their own admissions, the use of inadequate testing equipment, a
lack of understanding of the fundamentals of metabolised uranium and radiation
dose effects, and sub-standard scientific procedures. A review of a
fifth report
,
published by the U.S. Department of Energy on recycled uranium makes the
failures of the veterans’ follow-up and screening programs all the more
serious. This report is a landmark admission that the complete supply
chain of uranium stockpiles, from which depleted uranium, uranium alloyed and
composite uranium-high explosive ordnance are manufactured, are adulterated
with highly radioactive nuclear reactor waste.
Contradictions between government and independent research
It is well
known in the nuclear research and nuclear medicine community that the longer
the delay in assessment after exposure, internal contamination by uranium and
transuranic products becomes increasingly difficult to detect. Whereas
the deleterious biological and medical effects of internalised uranium
multiply over time, the incorporation of uranic materials into the body’s
tissues and organs makes their presence and radioactivity progressively harder
to detect and measure.
In 2002,
Canada and the United States showed in separate reports regarding the designs
and results of their DU follow-up and screening programs, how they may have
waited too long to be able to detect DU or to rule it out, in the urine of
hundreds (perhaps thousands) of veterans tested. The reports indicate
that if DU screening programs and clinical assessments had been properly
constructed and if they had conducted radiological tests earlier, a definitive
determination (of the presence or absence of DU) could have been made.
Even with these admissions, both governments continue to offer DU testing and
report to the veterans that they are not contaminated.
Independent
research and some of governments’ own sources contradict the position that
veterans have not been contaminated with DU or that it is too late to find it.
Independent research shows that 10 years and longer is not too late for
biological specimens of deceased and living veterans to reveal uranium
internal contamination or measure the presence of DU and other artificial
isotopes of uranium housed in their bodies.
Independent
laboratories and several government facilities with the capacity to conduct
proper radiological bio-assay studies could put to rest, once and for all, the
debate about veterans’ exposure to DU. Conspicuously, both the Canadian and
the U.S. Defense Departments have chosen not to engage the laboratories,
equipment or researchers with the capacity to measure low levels of uranium.
Instead, they expend effort to discredit these options and avoid initiating
properly structured and adequately resourced radio-biological and clinical
assessment programs.
Due to the
scientific and technical nature of these issues, an unsuspecting veteran’s
community, subject to the views of Defense and Veterans Affairs experts, is
ill equipped to argue effectively on its own behalf. Readers will see
that it is not, in fact, too late to detect and measure DU internal
contamination and determine whether Gulf War and Balkan veterans have been
contaminated during their deployments in DU battlefields.
The Canadian DU Screening Program
Canada’s
“voluntary DU screening program”
In April
2002, a joint paper by staff of the Canadian Department of National Defence’s
(DND) Medical Policy Unit, the Royal Military College (RMC) and their contract
laboratories reported the progress of Canada’s “voluntary screening program”
for veterans who suspect illnesses might be linked to DU internal
contamination. The paper, An Examination of Uranium Levels in
Canadian Forces Personnel Who Served in the Gulf War and Kosovo, E.A. Ough et
al, was published in the Health Physics Society Journal, 82(4):
527-532; April 2002. In it, the authors freely admit their
laboratories and scientists are unable to determine if the veterans
participating in the voluntary screening program have DU in their urine.
The paper
discusses DND’s procession through a series of botched radiological studies
(testing sick veterans’ urine samples) in which they are unable to accurately
detect and measure the levels and types of uranium in veterans’ urine.
In reference to three years of tax-payer funded work, the authors of the
DND-Ough, et al paper state: “In situations where these isotopic ratios
[expressing DU] are required, either the analytical technique or the
biological media being tested needs to be changed”. As a last
resort, instead of transferring the study to a laboratory with the capability
to detect low levels of DU in urine (the best, non-invasive biological test
material), DND elects to examine veterans’ hair. The use of body hair is
questioned by the authors themselves as a legitimate biological medium to
identify internally incorporated uranium (see below).
What
veterans should know: Mechanisms of uranium internal contamination
It is well
known that the primary mechanism of uranium internal contamination of Persian
Gulf and Balkan veterans is inhalation of air-borne particulate from
ballistically pulverised and thermally aerosolised DU-alloyed penetrators and
armour-defeat ordnance. Uranium oxides entering the body through the
lungs have a long metabolic life cycle. They are incorporated into
organs and tissues over many years, perhaps permanently.
Whereas 90%
or more of orally ingested uranium particulate and DU oxides are eliminated by
the body’s normal metabolic processes within 48 hours, inhaled uranium
contaminant is incorporated into various tissues and organs. Depending
on such factors as solubility, size and chemistry of the particulate (affected
by the thermo-ballistics of the weapon and environmental conditions), portions
will be eliminated immediately while other portions will be housed in “target
organs” (e.g., lungs, bone, spleen, liver, lymph glands, brain) to be slowly
released over the life of the veteran.
The kidneys,
being the organ of elimination of toxins in the blood, capture, concentrate
and excrete uranium. This is why urine is the preferred biological medium for
radiological assessments (DU bio-assays). The function of the kidneys
and their location in the metabolic life cycle of internalised uranium expose
them (kidneys) to radiological and heavy metal toxicity. The kidneys are among
the first organ systems to be damaged by uranium internal contamination – the
effects include reducing their efficiency at removing blood-borne toxins,
including uranium. Natural detoxification processes of the body, chronic
uranium internal contamination effects and incorporation into body tissues of
uranium carried by blood and lymph fluid will affect the quantities of uranium
present in urine.
An acute
exposure incident (i.e. deployment in DU battlefields) resulting in internal
contamination by inhalation of aerosolised DU is evidenced by a measurable,
short-term spike in the readings of concentrations of uranium in urine.
Delaying tests intended to measure the quantities of uranium and the specific
isotopes that comprise the increased quantities (i.e., depleted uranium) leads
to a reduction of the measurable quantities and the presence of the specific
type of the uranium responsible for the acute exposure. As a result, the
quantities and specific isotopes signifying DU become progressively more
difficult, but not impossible to assay. At a certain point in the life
cycle of metabolised uranium, due in part to kidney dysfunction, tissue
incorporation and the quantities inhaled, DU levels in the urine may become so
low that only the most sensitive laboratory equipment and accurate laboratory
procedures can detect its presence. When these limits are reached other
biological media found in uranium’s metabolic pathways can be studied (i.e.,
lungs, lymph, bone).
The Canadian
Department of National Defense has successfully resisted acknowledging any
possibility of DU’s role in post-deployment deaths and illnesses of its Gulf
War and Balkan veterans. By delaying radiological assessments for years,
the quantities of DU continues to decline towards the threshold of detection
for all but the most experienced laboratories and sensitive detection
instruments.
DND explains
why is can’t find DU
To identify
DU in any organic or inorganic sample, the three natural isotopes of uranium
must be measured. Depleted Uranium’s molecular signature is unmistakable
and represented by a specific ratio of the proportions of the two most
abundant isotopes of uranium (238U and 235U). Since uranium composed of
the proportions of isotopes signifying DU does not exist in nature, any amount
detected is evidence of man-made contamination (i.e. the internal
incorporation of an artificially manufactured substance). Its presence
at this late date (once the external source of contamination is eliminated)
can only be explained by the fact that inhaled uranium is continuing its
metabolic life through long, complex and toxic biological processes in the
bodies of exposed veterans.
In its
Health Physics paper, DND admits its screening program cannot detect or
measure these isotopes: “The low urinary uranium concentrations [in the
veterans samples] voided any attempts at isotopic (238U:235U) assays.”
Since DND-Ough et al published their paper over-viewing the results of the
Canadian veterans’ screening program, the Uranium Medical Research Centre
(UMRC) published a paper showing conclusively that some Canadian veterans are
contaminated with DU. UMRC
reported DU in veterans’ urine 10 years after the Gulf War, in approximately
50% of veterans tested. In its study, The Quantitative Analysis of
Depleted Uranium Isotopes in British, Canadian, and U.S. Gulf war Veterans;
Journal of Military Medicine, August 2002, veterans whose total
quantities of uranium in urine were at normal population ranges, are shown to
have DU below background levels. This demonstrates that the proper methods and
equipment can detect artificial uranium contaminant at very low levels, long
after exposure.
Playing
Russian roulette with veterans’ lives
The fundamental question to be answered by DND’s screening
program is whether there is Depleted Uranium in the veterans’ urine, or not.
In the Health Physics paper, DND-Ough et al indicate their laboratory
equipment and methods do not work: “INAA, DNAA, and ICP-MS cannot
provide the required sensitivity for the measurement of 238U:235U isotopic
ratio in urine samples.” [INAA, DNAA, and ICP-MS refer to the equipment
and procedures DND contract laboratories and the RMC use to detect and measure
the uranium isotopes.]
Following
each of DND’s testing situations, the failure to detect the isotopes leads DND
to move to a new laboratory in attempts to isolate the isotopes.
Referring to each new laboratory, the authors conclude: the “MDL”
(Method Detection Limits or Instrument’s Detection Limits of the procedures
and equipment] could not measure the concentrations of the isotopes of
uranium, and therefore could not determine the nature of the uranium found in
the veterans’ urine.
Given that
DND-Ough et al were aware that delaying radiological assessment would
challenge the accuracy and sensitivity of their equipment, they were faced
with a decision. Either they use a lab and researchers capable of measuring
low levels of radioisotopes or they use an alternative biological media where
the isotopes are easier to detect this long after exposure. DND’s
decision has been to offer the veterans the option of testing body hair: “…
for those veterans still requesting isotopic assays, hair samples [were]
submitted for ICP-MS analysis.”
Nineteen
veterans, who might have known through their own reading, the necessity of
measuring isotopic ratios to rule in or out DU contamination, unwittingly
elected to participate. What they don’t know is that the use of body
hair is irrelevant to measuring uranium internal contamination. Body
hair is simply not in the metabolic pathways of uranium contamination. This is
so fundamental a mistake, one wonders if DND’s physicians and chemists
confused uranium with arsenic. The authors, themselves, question the
decision: “Hair analysis may be complicated by exogenous uranium
exposure.” They later state in the paper: “…but, there may be
concerns about the origin (endogenous and/or exogenous) of uranium [in
hair].”
DND ignores recommendations how to detect DU
Over six
years ago independent researchers and experts in uranium internal
contamination recommended to DND, the proper equipment and methodology to
detect and measure the isotopes of uranium
in veterans’ urine
:
1.
Ensure that the biological specimens are known to be organs, tissues or
fluids in the metabolic pathways of uranium internal contamination. Urine or
biopsies of target organs and bone were suggested. Body hair is not in the
metabolic pathways of uranium.
2.
Follow a proven methodology for preparing biological samples for
radiological study and protect them from exogenous and environmental
contamination sources.
3.
The proper laboratory equipment, the method of preparing the specimens, and
the proper operation and reading of the equipment are critical to ensuring
accuracy and repeatability. Thermal Ionising Mass Spectrometry (TIMS)
was recommended.
4.
Screening programs need to determine the presence of DU by measuring the
isotopic concentrations of 238U and 235U and calculate their ratios. Total
quantities (concentrations) of uranium are not relevant this long after
exposure (see below).
5.
To accurately determine the 238U:235U ratio requires equipment capable of
measuring picogram concentrations of the 235U isotope which is only 0.2% to
0.72 % of the total uranium concentration in a sample. To ensure this
level of sensitivity, we again recommended Thermal Ionising Mass
Spectrometry (TIMS).
Contrary to
DND-Ough et al, the total uranium concentration in urine is irrelevant to
determining internal contamination or the presence of DU when looking for
trace quantities several years after exposure. Metabolised DU remaining
after several years is likely to be overshadowed by daily dietary intake and
excretion of naturally-occurring (ubiquitous) uranium, ingested orally from
the food-chain. Systemic biological effects on the kidneys and long-term
metabolic processes of internalized uranium will also affect the measurable
quantities. Normal or below normal total quantities of uranium in
veterans’ urine therefore, does not rule DU in, or out. Even so, DND-Ough et
al concludes: “The concentrations of total uranium in the urine of
Canadian veterans were well within the range determined for non-occupationally
exposed individuals.” This point is scientifically and medically
irrelevant to the question of DU contamination.
In the
absence of the ability to measure isotopic ratios in body tissues and fluids
that incorporate and concentrate uranium, it is impossible for DND-Ough et al
to state with accuracy, that any urine samples of Canadian veterans’
participating in the screening program contain Natural Uranium or Depleted
Uranium.
Is DND trying to mislead veterans and their families
?
DND, RMC and
their contractors reveal either they don’t know the biology and chemistry of
uranium internal contamination or an intentional effort to mislead veterans.
Even though their methods and equipment are admittedly unable to rule DU in or
out, they conclude and then inform veterans and their families that because
“total concentrations” (quantities) of uranium found in their urine are
normal, DU is not present. They imply that if it is present, it is lost
in the background of the total concentrations of uranium and therefore not at
levels significant to health.
Veterans
should know the facts and understand what is (and is not) revealed in the
DND-Ough et al report:
1.
It is technologically possible to detect and measure DU, 10 years and longer
after exposure.
2.
The Canadian government’s screening program does not measure or express the
isotopic ratios of biological samples in the metabolic pathway of uranium
and therefore fails to determine if veterans are or are not contaminated.
3.
Even at trace levels, several years after exposure, small quantities of DU
translate retroactively into proportionately higher and therefore
biologically significant levels of DU intake at the time of exposure.
4.
The laboratories and researchers in DND's screening program have themselves
admitted they cannot detect DU.
5.
Rather than proving independent researchers can’t find DU, DND-Ough et al’s
report shows DND’s DU screening program has reached is technological
limitations.
Contrary to what DND-Ough et al lead readers and the
participating veterans to believe, they still don’t know if the several
hundred Canadian veterans tested over three years have DU contamination.
The longer DND delays using the proper methods, equipment and biological
media, the progressively lower the chance of conclusive analyses. The
situation described in the DND-Ough et al report reveals how DND is not
considering the possibility of inhalation exposure or chronic internal
contamination of veterans. Finding DU at this late date, at levels below
normal concentrations of uranium is evidence of a chronic, heavy metal, toxic
radiological risk derived from an acute exposure incident in the veterans’
histories. DND cannot legitimately draw valid conclusions based on the
science outlined in its study. They simple don’t know. Yet, they
continue to offer veterans a program that doesn’t work and tell them the
science says there is nothing to worry about.
The U.S. DU Follow-Up Program
What’s
wrong with DOD’s DU Follow-up Program ?
Veterans attempting to wade through the endless expanse of government
documents and official-agency testimonials by NATO, CDC, NRC, IOM the UN’s
subsidiary agencies (WHO, UNEP, IAEA), and the U.S. Defense and Veterans
Affairs Departments, have to face a myriad of biased opinions and carefully
constructed “facts”. The supposed, responsible objectivity of these
organisations is belied over and over again by their incessant efforts to
write reports to substantiate pre-determined conclusions that with the
exception of DU shrapnel wounded veterans, no one is at risk from DU
contamination. Instead of examining the work of independent researchers
or making a serious attempt to replicate studies whose methods and conclusions
are contrary to the official-view, they selectively ignore this work and
refuse to make it available to veterans for examination.
The U.S. Department of Defence’s Environmental Exposure Reports on the Gulf
and the Balkans have been served-up to veterans as the penultimate compendium
of collected studies and official viewpoints. The DOD and DVA are
dropping these reports in the laps of veterans across America, touting the DOD/DVA
Veterans’ Follow-Up Program as the final word on the matter.
How can veterans argue against the apparently rational and expensively
orchestrated epidemiological and clinical programs apparently dedicated to the
veterans, themselves? Not only do the flaws abound, these flaws point to
the issues at the heart of the scientific and medical questions about DU.
1.
The DOD/DVA Veterans Follow-Up Program does not include radiological
laboratory analysis
of the isotopes of uranium in the biological specimens provided by the
Registry veterans who have been selected for detailed clinical studies.
Without determining exactly what isotopes of uranium are in the veterans’
urine, it misrepresents fact to state that there is no evidence of DU
(irrespective of total concentrations).
It is worth noting that when the DOD/DVA and other NATO countries did refer a
few veterans (not retaining shrapnel) for isotopic bio-assays, DU was in fact
identified in their urine.
2.
There is no satisfactory or objective definition of “uranium internal
contamination” expressed in the Follow-Up Program protocols. By definition,
the presence of any level of DU in the urine (or other biological specimens)
of veterans or civilians is evidence of contamination by an artificially
produced and deployed radiological material. Any level found is, with
the possible exception of the veterans retaining DU shrapnel, an indication
that inhalational exposure occurred.
3.
The structure of the program’s protocols for follow-up clinical studies
is not “symptoms-driven”. The program accepts all veterans irrespective
of symptom profiles and does not assess veterans based on histories of DU
exposure or health. Some efforts were introduced in 1998-99 to correct
this deficiency but the DOD/DVA do not acknowledge established symptom profile
models of uranium internal contamination for veterans. Without the
symptoms’ model, the veterans cannot be properly diagnosed or referred.
The proof of this deficiency lies in the fact that if DU contamination was
taken seriously, veterans who present with symptoms of uranium internal
contamination and deployment histories of battlefield exposure would be
automatically referred for bioassays to identify the ratios of uranium
isotopes (not just total concentrations).
4.
DOD’s and the DVA’s persistent adherence to the “total concentrations
of uranium” argument is a give-away that the Follow-Up Program is structured
to direct veterans away from the necessary radiological studies and to dismiss
any possibility of chronic internal contamination or inhalational exposure. On
one hand, total concentrations of uranium in urine, higher than normal
populations, can only be expected as a result of recent exposure. On the
other hand, normal total concentrations (quantities) of uranium do not mean
that the veterans were not contaminated in the past. The analysis of
total concentrations -- the DVA/DOD procedure in use -- does not express the
compositions of the isotopes of uranium. Without measuring the isotopes
to detect the signature of DU, it is a misrepresentation of fact to state that
“no significant exposure occurred because the concentrations are normal”.
The DOD/DVA program is constructed for persons who have recent exposure,
largely by oral ingestion and retained shrapnel. It does not account for
inhaled uranium particulate, metabolised and incorporated into the body,
resulting in long term chronic, internal exposure.
5.
The Environmental Exposure Reports are peppered with statements that
dismiss risks of exposure based on the “effective biological dose” model of
the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP). The
question of radiological dose effects of internally incorporated uranium
products via inhalation is the single most contentious scientific issue with
fundamental implications for DU exposed veterans. There are scientific
studies and professionals challenging the ICRP model – sufficient enough to
create serious doubts about the biological dose effect assumptions used by DOD/DVA.
The alternative views are argued best in the European scientific community and
are given short shrift in North American’s nuclear establishment. This
issue is beyond the scope of this paper as there is little value to measuring
dose effects if there is not conclusive proof of retention of DU in the body
in the first place. The primary question and essential clinical building
block is to determine if veterans are contaminated – evidenced by finding or
ruling out DU through conducting the proper radiological bio-assay studies
using procedures, equipment and researchers capable of detecting it.
The fundamental deficiencies in the Gulf and Balkan veterans’ follow-up
program make a sham of the Veterans’ Registry, the clinical protocols and
associated epidemiological studies. Surprisingly, the Institute of
Medicine, in its 1997 and 1998 evaluations of the clinical protocols fails to
note that the follow-up program does not direct physicians to order
isotopic-ratio, bio-assays for veterans whose symptoms and histories suggest
uranium internal contamination.
The Follow-Up Program and its government-funded, substantiating third-party
evaluations show that it is structured so as not to find DU --- simply by the
fact that it omits protocols connecting exposure histories and symptoms with
tests that measure the composition of the uranium in the veterans. The
Gulf War Environmental Exposure Report (II) sets up a line of defence against
these obvious criticisms which DOD would logically be expecting from those not
required to parrot the official line. DOD and the DVA offer the
following to take up their posture of defence:
“During
the past year, various … claims of elevated uranium in urine
samples
from veterans … based in unpublished, non-peer reviewed data …based their
conclusion
on measurements of uranium isotopes using nuclear techniques.
Discussions with scientists have
indicated
that measuring uranium-238 with these
techniques
can be subject to considerable error.”
“Not
surprisingly, the discrepancies between the
government’s and outside laboratories test results concern veterans. …
In April 2000, a non-governmental,
independent laboratory started an eight-month study of
these
laboratories measuring techniques and findings.”
Shoring up
the weak link in DOD’s clinical protocols
In October
2002, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) published the above mentioned,
eight-month study on the internet as an Information Paper to “aid in
understanding the capabilities and limitations of certain methods of measuring
uranium and depleted uranium in urine…”. Titled, Impact of
Laboratory Performance of Urine Uranium Analysis on Exposure Evaluations for
Gulf War Veterans, DOD’s Information Paper expresses two purposes:
(1)
Question the quality and therefore results of independent findings of DU in
Gulf War and Balkan veterans; and,
(2)
Evaluate the performance of DOD’s contract labs and the Department of
Veterans Affairs’ (DVA) laboratories at detecting and measuring DU in the
veterans’ urine.
Similar to
the Canadian Department of National Defense’s DU screening program, DOD
presents information to veterans that might lead them to believe that
independent research is not reliable and, even if it is, it’s not relevant as
there is little possibility of finding DU in urine at this late date.
DOD’s Information Paper is presented as a review of the performance of the
DVA’s and their contract laboratories participating in DU screening programs.
The paper compares the capacity of 6 Canadian and U.S. laboratories. The
laboratories are selected as a study group to determine if they can reliably
detect and measure different artificial and natural uranium isotopes in
synthetic urine. The poor performance of the government’s contract
laboratories allows DOD to make a self-serving leap in logic and cast doubt on
the findings of independent researchers: “Those results [of independent
studies] were inconsistent with the urinary uranium values reported by the
Department of Veterans Affairs and therefore raise questions about the
reliability of the laboratory analysis [of the independent researchers]”.
It is
noteworthy that the Atlantic Radiogenic Isotopic Research Facility (ARIRF),
Memorial University, Newfoundland was not included in the study. This
lab participated in UMRC’s and other researchers’ independent and published
studies confirming DU in veteran’s urine. Dr. Asaf Durakovic and Dr.
Leonard Dietz, working with Dr. Patricia Horan, formerly of ARIRF, found the
isotopic ratios of uranium that signify DU in the urine of U.S., Canadian and
British veterans. The findings and an explanation of the methodology
needed to measure DU several years after exposure, is published in the
Journal of Military Medicine, August 2002: The Quantitative Analysis of
Depleted Uranium Isotopes in British, Canadian, and
U.S. Gulf
war Veterans.
It is also
notable that DOD did not include in this “independent study”, its own, highly
specialised nuclear research laboratories. DOD’s own labs, the U.S.
Armed Forces Radiological Research Institute (AFRRI) and DOD’s long-term
contract laboratories are among the best-equipped radiological assessment
facilities in the world. Established during the Manhattan Project as
state-of-the-art radiogenic research facilities,
these labs have conducted uranium research and nuclear weapons development for
60 years. They publicly advertise their ability to detect low-levels of
isotopes of uranium and transuranics and sell these services to the private
sector and DOD, to do just that.
DOD claims
DU can’t be found two
weeks after exposure
In its Information Paper, DOD presents a discussion of the metabolic and
radiological mechanisms of uranium. As DOD states, it is not possible to
identify whether subjects have incorporated DU without measuring the uranium
isotopes comprising DU. Yet, this fact is not included anywhere in the
post-conflict, veterans’ follow-up program documentation or delineated in any
of the Environmental Exposure Reports.
DOD implies that it has the capacity to detect and measure trace amounts of
the isotopes of uranium and that this capacity is inherent to its own,
long-term, operational screening programs. DOD states that its
laboratory performance reviews are responsible for ensuring this capacity is
achieved and retained in its laboratories: “Laboratory accreditation
programs … ensure accurate and reproducible analytical results.”
Yet, DOD immediately exposes that it’s screening program laboratories do not
perform reliably: “However, these programs [DOD’s screening
program laboratories] do not uniformly include measurements of total or
isotopic uranium in urine”.
DOD’s advice
to veterans and its conclusions about the technological capabilities of its
laboratories are similar to the Canadian DND program, outlined in:
An Examination of Uranium Levels in Canadian Forces Personnel Who Served in
the Gulf War and Kosovo, E.A. Ough et al, April 2002. By expressing
that the laboratories are unable to reliably and accurately detect and measure
the isotopes of uranium – DOD admits it is not able to rule DU in, or out, in
the urine of Gulf War and Balkan veterans.
DOD states
an important fact about chronic uranium internal contamination. Acute
exposure incidents by uranium can be detected in urine years after the point
of biological up-take: “For inhaled uranium oxides … some uranium
appears in urine [years after exposure]”; and, “Ten years later
[after exposure], that individual would still be excreting … [this]
uranium in urine every day”. DOD then sets a very convenient
technological benchmark: “Within a week or two after possible exposure,
there would be little or no chance for incorrectly identifying the result with
the actual exposure”, but “…acceptable performance can only be achieved
for samples collected within a week or two of exposure [author’s
emphasis].”
DOD uses its
evaluation of the 6 laboratories to discredit in the minds of veterans,
independent research contrary to the protocols of the Follow-up program and
the performance of its own laboratories: “This performance [of DOD’s
evaluated labs] demonstrates the uncertainty in drawing conclusions about
the nature of uranium present, at least for the six participating
laboratories”. Rather than effectively challenging the veracity of
findings of independent studies, DOD is admitting its program’s have technical
limitations – that its methods, equipment and scientists are not reliably able
to detect and measure the isotopes of DU.
DOD sacrifices its friends to convince veterans
Just as DND,
DOD has also avoided conducting DU bio-assay programs to a point in time they
state makes it difficult to confirm or deny uranium internal contamination:
“While adequate performance for evaluating uranium exposure based on total
uranium
[concentrations] was achieved, improvements in sensitivity [of
equipment and procedure] are needed to accurately determine concentrations
approaching those of normal diet”. DOD is trying to convince veterans
that (1) trace amounts of specific radioisotopes cannot be accurately measured
by its labs because the contaminant is masked by the normal dietary intake
levels; and, (2) the concentrations (quantities) of uranium found by the
laboratories are similar to the naturally occurring uranium present in all
peoples’ urine – attributing no significance to any past exposure via
inhalation.
DOD is
explicit about the technological limits of equipment and methods used: “[DOD
evaluated] Laboratories had considerably more difficulty measuring
individual uranium isotopes, particularly at lower concentration(s) ... . The
sporadic performance … occurred because the amounts … in the samples were
close to laboratory detection limits”. By expressing these
limitations, the Defense Department and the DVA admit their methods and
equipment, at best, can measure only the total concentrations of uranium in
the urine of veterans who may have been contaminated in DU battlefields.
Without
reliable identification of the specific uranium isotopes, conclusions as to
whether there is or is not DU in the veterans’ urine cannot be made. To
discredit independent findings of DU in veterans’ urine, the Information
Paper’s final conclusion sacrifices the reputation of the laboratories
participating in DOD’s review: “[The DOD’s evaluated laboratories’] …
unacceptable performance … indicates that claims [by independents] to
have done so [identify DU] should be treated with caution”.
Why are the
Baltimore DVA & AFRRI studies treated as an exception
?
Both the
Canadian and the U.S. Defense Departments’ reports make a notable exception
about finding DU several months to years after exposure. They recognise the
Baltimore Department of Veterans Affairs
(DVA) and
AFRRI (Armed Forces Radiobiological Research Institute) follow-on studies
which found DU isotopes
of uranium in urine years after exposure: “DVA laboratories” … “have
detected elevated concentrations of urinary uranium in veterans who retained
depleted uranium fragments in their bodies…”.
The DVA
studies pose a particularly interesting contrast between veterans in the
government’s verses independent studies. The DND paper states: “Media
reports have indicated that independent laboratory analysis of urine confirmed
depleted uranium exposure in Gulf War veterans who did not retain fragments”
[author’s emphasis]. Both Defense Departments’ emphasis on the
distinction between the two groups of veterans (with and without retained DU
shrapnel) allows them to retreat from the most prolific DU contamination
pathway: inhalation and the lungs.
The DVA’s
and AFRRI’s studies are used to divert attention from the area of greatest
concern to the greatest number of veterans: inhaled aerosols. Shrapnel
wounding is a concern to only a few dozens of veterans. Its relevance
and relationship to inhaled uranium is still being studied. The body’s normal
response to the introduction of foreign objects (e.g. shrapnel) is to isolate
the object by a response called “encapsulation”. Shrapnel particles are
1000’s of times larger than the aerosolised oxides inhaled in DU battlefields
and subject to different metabolic pathways. Inhalable uranium
particulate on the other hand is composed of various classes of microscopic
particulate, ranging from soluble to insoluble uranium oxides, which when
inhaled are retained by or transported from the lungs to uranium’s known
target organs.
A logical
first conclusion about elevated uranium findings associated with retained DU
shrapnel (found shortly after exposure) is that it is coincident with
inhalational exposure (into the lungs). Yet, virtually all follow-on research
sponsored by the Defense Departments ignores the lung-inhalational pathway,
spending research dollars to favour DU shrapnel and “nose-only” inhalational
exposures
.
Armed forces personnel deployed where DU shrapnel wounding occurred are
exposed, by definition, to high concentrations of air-borne, thermally
aerosolised and ballistically pulverised DU.
Current
funding of millions of dollars dedicated to follow-on studies of veterans and
laboratory animals misdirects the budgets and misleads the veterans. The
“nose-brain barrier”/ “nose-only inhalation” research is a particular example.
While it is an anatomical fact that the first of 12 cranial nerves (olfactory
filaments) extend to the retro-nasal cribriform cranial plate, there is no
such morphological or physiological entity called a “nose-brain barrier”.
It simply doesn’t exist. The ‘blood-brain barrier”, in contrast, might
be altered by toxic agents, and allow access of DU to the brain by altering
brain capillary permeability. The olfactory epithalium still operates
via blood-neuron interaction, whether in the nose or not in the nose.
The “nose-only pathway” research will substantially fund, for example, the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, a lab that was not included in the DND
or DOD screening programs but which is capable of conclusively measuring
low-levels of DU in urine 10 years after exposure.
Conclusion
Recycled
uranium – complicating the mix
The fact that DND and DOD have made selective acknowledgements of some facts
and deny others remains a quandary for veterans. The constructing of
follow-up and screening programs that persist at refusing to conduct isotopic
analyses on veterans whose medical symptoms and deployment histories suggest a
high likelihood of inhalational exposure to DU is a distinct contradiction
with other government policies and a slap in the face to veterans. Most
notable is the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program
Act of 2000. This U.S. legislation established a $1.6 billion dollar
entitlement program to help workers who develop cancers and lung diseases as a
result of inhalational exposure to uranium and transuranic products in the
Department of Energy’s (DOE) nuclear complex. These DOE-complex
contaminants are among the elements now known to be present in the stockpiles
of raw materials and metal fabrication inventories used to make DU penetrators
and non-fissionable, uranium alloyed and uranium-high explosive, composite
weapons
.
In March 2001, the DOE released A Preliminary Review of the Flow and
Characteristics of Recycled Uranium Throughout the DOE Complex 1952 – 1999.
This landmark public report examines the uranium inventory and evaluates the
impact of recycled uranium and reactor, spent-fuel products circulated
throughout the DOE’s and its private sector contractors’ uranium processing,
nuclear fuel, and weapons development, feed stockpiles. The contents of
recycled uranium are exponentially more radioactive than pure, Virgin Uranium
and pure Depleted Uranium. This mix of materials contains “transuranic
elements, fission products, spent fuel products and nuclear activation
products” of plutonium 239, 241, 242, uranium-236, and neptunium (and a host
of other elements and toxins not listed in the report). The problem shown by
this study is that none of the Depleted Uranium metal inventories used to
produce DU ordnance are pure.
In a surprising admission, DOD shows that the entire stockpile of uranium is
adulterated by 50 years of recycling and blending transuranics into the
feedstock of the uranium enrichment process (DU constitutes 4/5ths of the
output of this cycle as a by-product of uranium enrichment). A section
in the report addresses DU and attempts to downplay the radiological
consequences of the adulteration of the metals and alloys used to make
non-fissionable weapons and tank armour. Both independent and government
radiological analyses of DU penetrators collected from DU
battlefields have detected trace amounts of transuranics, including
plutonium-239 in the metal. Independent studies have detected traces of
uranium-236 in veterans’ urine; adding a new dimension to the inhalational
exposure risks to veterans from recycled uranium elements. Transuranics
and spent fuel products are 10’s of 1,000’s of times more radioactive than
pure DU or pure, Non-Depleted Uranium (Virgin Uranium). Radiological
studies of the isotopes of uranium in urine of veterans and DU battlefields,
if properly conducted, would be able to detect, measure and confirm or exclude
the presence of transuranics in addition to the signature of Depleted Uranium.
The degree of increase of the internal radiation dose from transuranics has
not been examined beyond theoretical
calculations
.
DOD and NATO defense departments have been sponsoring studies to draw
conclusions that it is not present, and if it is, its not relevant.
DOD’s failure to even consider the possibility of transuranics contamination
in the Follow-Up program protocols suggests that there is more than DU to
worry about.
12 years is
not too late
By their own
admissions, DND’s and DOD’s DU screening and follow-up programs have not been
conducted by laboratories and researchers reliably able to measure DU in
veterans. Instead, multi-millions of research dollars are diverted to
gratuitous studies
of
laboratory animals to examine irrelevant anatomical mechanisms and
questionable biological pathways -- body hair, shrapnel, “nose-only
inhalation”, and “nose-brain barriers”. The outcomes of these
studies will be meaningless for the majority of Gulf and Balkan veterans.
Inadequate
and inconclusive radiological, bio-assay programs mean no proofs (one way or
another) of DU contamination for deceased, ill and dying veterans or the
possible links to mutagenic effects of this contamination on their children.
This means the largest population of battlefield DU exposed veterans will not
be recognised – even if they have, in fact, been contaminated. Research
into pathways of tertiary medical interest will not examine the causal
relationship between DU inhalational exposure and its affects on health. Nor
will it examine the primary mechanisms of exposure and environmental transport
vectors coinciding with veterans’ deployment histories or civilians present in
the Persian Gulf and Balkan theatres. Twelve years later, the whole
matter still hinges on the proper analysis and measurements of the isotopic
ratios. Without these fundamental proofs, the veterans will be no further
ahead than they ever were: not knowing, not being compensated, and not
receiving proper clinical support.
A
responsible approach by DND and DOD would be to set-up technologically
competent screening programs for all veterans presenting with symptoms of
uranium internal contamination, coincident with deployment histories in known
DU battlefields. Where DU and possibly transuranics, are conclusively
detected in veterans’ urine, research can begin relevant biological and
clinical studies of the target organs, metabolic pathways, radiation dose
models and systemic effects of uranium internal contamination via inhalation.
Contrary to DND’s and DOD’s programs, independent research and even the
military’s own, recent admissions are proof that there is still time and the
available technology to measure DU in veterans. Twelve years in not too
late for this to be done right.
________________
Footnotes
An
Examination of Uranium Levels in Canadian Forces Personnel Who Served in
the Gulf War and Kosovo,
E.A. Ough et al, Health Physics Society Journal, 82(4): 527-532; April
2002.
Information Paper;
Impact of Laboratory Performance of Urine Uranium Analysis on Exposure
Evaluations for Gulf War Veterans, Department of Defense, October 18,
2002.
Environmental
Exposure Report, Depleted Uranium in the Gulf (II),
Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Department of Defense,
December 13, 2000.
Information Paper; Depleted Uranium Environmental and Medical
Surveillance in the Balkans, Department of Defense, October 25,
2001.
A Preliminary Review of the Flow and Characteristics of Recycled Uranium
Throughout the DOE Complex, 1952 – 1999; Project Overview and Field
Site Reports; U.S. Department of Energy, March 2001.
Medical Information for Patients – Health Services, Canadian Forces
Voluntary Depleted Uranium Test Program, National Defence,
www.dnd.ca/health/information/
For a comprehensive review of effects of uranium internal contamination, see:
Medical Effects of Internal Contamination with Uranium, Asaf Durakovic,
Croatian Medical Journal, (40) (1), March 1999,
http://www.cmj.hr/1999/4001/400110.htm
Asaf Durakovic, Patricia Horan, Leonard Dietz;
The
Quantitative Analysis of Depleted Uranium Isotopes in British, Canadian,
and U.S. Gulf war Veterans;
Journal of Military Medicine, August 2002.
For a discussion of the methods of detection, see: On Depleted
Uranium: Gulf War and Balkan Syndrome; Asaf Durakovic MD, Ph.D;
Croatian Medical Journal, 42(2):130-134, 2001. <http://www.vms.hr/cmj>
Environmental Exposure Report II, Tab P, DOD and VA Medical
Evaluation Program for Gulf Veterans with Potential Exposures shows
that medical follow-up and clinical study protocols are designed only to
measure total uranium concentrations – not isotopic ratios.
Medical Assessments of Balkan Veterans, Part V; Information Paper -
Depleted Uranium Environmental and Medical Surveillance in the Balkans,
Department of Defense, October 25, 2001. DOD cites a total of 22 studies
and the results of uranium bio-assays of veterans from 20 countries of
which all but one study concluded that there is no DU based on total
concentrations of uranium. Only one, a UK MOD study analyzed the
isotopic ratios in urine -- it found Depleted Uranium in UK Balkan
veterans.
For an excellent analysis of dose effect issues, linear energy transfer,
the epidemiology of inhalational exposure, and cellular and mutagenic
effects of radiological internal contamination, see <<www.LLRC.org>
for the works of Dr.’s Chris Busby, Richard Bramhall and John Gofman.
Adequacy of the VA
Persian Gulf Registry and
Uniform Case Assessment Protocol,
1998; and, Adequacy of the Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program:
A Focused Assessment, 1997; Committee on the Evaluation of the
Department of Veterans Affairs Uniform Case Assessment Protocol,
Institute of Medicine.
Medical Testing by Other Laboratories, Section 5, Part D;
Environmental Exposure Report II, DU in the Gulf, DOD, 2000.
Correction: independent studies have not based their work on “elevated
concentrations,” but rather, findings of the specific isotopes of DU in
veterans’ urine.
Readers are referred to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, as
one example among several, to examine advertisements for low-level
isotopic analysis and explicit declarations of this analytical facility
as a selling feature of its bio-assay services.
See discussion of veterans retaining DU shrapnel fragments; Section
V. Subsection E.1: Embedded Fragment Research; Environmental
Exposure Report, Depleted Uranium in the Gulf II, DOD, 2000.
Determination of the Isotopic Composition of Uranium in Urine by
Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry, Ejnik et al, Armed
Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, Health Physics, Volume
78, Number 2, February 2000. Veterans whose uranium was assayed for
isotopic ratios show DU in urine.
Scientists Study DU – Gulf War Illness Link <<http://www.lrri.org/>>
DOE’s Ohio Field Office Recycled Uranium Project Report, May 15, 2000,
indicates DU kinetic energy penetrators and other DU alloyed weapons
were made from transuranic-adulterated feed stock and metals which have
been in production since 1974.
UN Environmental Program press release, reported in The Guardian, Feb
17, 2001, UK.
Plutonium in DU Penetrators, McLaughlin et al; Archive of Oncology;
9(4), 225-9, 2001.
Medical Consequences of Depleted Uranium, Dr. Helen Caldicott,
Depleted Uranium Watch, March 2, 2001.
For a sample of currently funded DOD - DU related research that will not
get veterans any closer to knowing if they are contaminated, see:
Medsearch – “Medical Reference for Gulf War-Related Research”.
Compare the budgets of these studies to the cost of conducting
radioisotopic bio-assays on the urine of just one veteran: $1,000 USD.
__________________
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